Constitutional Development in South Africa and the Role of the Namibian Constitutional Model by Gross, Craig
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 16
Number 2 Winter 1993 Article 10
1-1-1993
Constitutional Development in South Africa and
the Role of the Namibian Constitutional Model
Craig Gross
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Craig Gross, Constitutional Development in South Africa and the Role of the Namibian Constitutional Model, 16 Hastings Int'l & Comp.
L. Rev. 269 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol16/iss2/10
Constitutional Development in South
Africa and the Role of the Namibian
Constitutional Model
By CRAIG GRoss*
Member of the Class of 1993
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional engineering is increasingly a favorite topic among
political scientists and legal scholars. In the 1950s and '60s, numerous
third world countries shed their colonial status and established independ-
ent nationhood, in the process generating a legacy of artificial borders
and intense ethnic strife. More recently, the breakdown of Communist
rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union produced a patch-
work of independent states, unleashing a wave of ethnic hostility and, in
some instances, outright warfare. These events and others demonstrate
the need for constitutional structures and formulas to contain those la-
tent ethnic hostilities, formerly suppressed by the monolithic presence of
a colonial power or a Communist Party apparatus, but now free to ex-
press themselves to the detriment of all members of these emerging na-
tion-states.
In the past several years, such issues of constitution-building have
taken on considerable importance in southern Africa, another region of
the world torn by ethnic and racial strife. In 1989, Namibia gained inde-
pendence from South Africa and began the process of drafting a demo-
cratic constitution viewed by some as Africa's most progressive.1 In
South Africa, a liberalizing trend began to erode the legal basis of that
country's apartheid policies. This fundamental shift in policy by the
white-ruled government prompted numerous constitutional proposals
seeking to extend political power to South Africa's black majority.
This Note will briefly outline the Namibian constitution in its in-
fancy, focusing on two features of the document: (1) the structure and
* B.A., University of California, San Diego, 1990.
1. See eg., Lynn Berat, The Future of Customary Law in Namibia. A Call for an Inte-
gration Model, 15 HASTINGS INVL & CoMP. L. RE'V. 1 (1991).
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powers of the legislative body and (2) the electoral laws, or formula by
which votes are translated into legislative seats. The primary objective of
the Note, however, is to analyze and assess the various proposals promul-
gated for a new South African constitution, also with an emphasis on
proposals relating to legislative structure and electoral laws. Finally, the
Note will discuss the extent to which the Namibian constitution might
serve as a potential model for South Africa's own constitution. This
comparative analysis is of particular salience given the ethnically and ra-
cially diverse make-up of both societies.2 Moreover, both the physical
proximity of Namibia to South Africa and South Africa's long and unset-
tling involvement in the Namibian independence process have left an in-
delible mark on the ruling elite in South Africa. In some ways, given the
similarities of the two countries' histories-a white minority exercising
complete political and economic control over a black majority-
Namibia's experience at constitutional engineering may be viewed as a
microcosm of the larger and potentially more explosive political battle to
come in South Africa.
Although the demographic similarities between South Africa and
Namibia inevitably invite comparison, important differences do exist be-
tween the political and social experiences of these two societies. In fact,
it is these dissimilarities that compel the conclusion that the Namibian
constitution, despite its apparent success at this early stage, serves only
limited utility as a model for South Africa.
H. BACKGROUND: CURRENT EVENTS IN NAMIBIA
Any discussion of recent Namibian history will necessarily implicate
South Africa, its volatile neighbor to the south. South African hegemony
over Namibia can be traced back to World War I, when the former Ger-
man colony of South-West Africa was captured by South African forces.3
2. The ethnic/racial breakdown of Namibian society is roughly 87% black, 6% white,
and 7% mixed race or colored. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DISPATCH: NAMIBIA (1991), available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. In addition, the black community is further broken
down into various ethnic/tribal segments with the Ovambo predominating. Id. The demo-
graphic breakdown in South Africa is roughly 75% black, 13% white, 10% mixed race or
colored, and 2% Asian. Sebastian Mallaby, After Apartheid; The Quest for a Constitution, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1990, at 5 (these figures are based on a total population estimate in 1989
of 36.5 million, including the independent homelands). The white community can be further
broken down into English-speakers and Afrikaners. The black population is also divided into
numerous ethnic/tribal constituencies with the Xhosas and Zulus being the numerically and
politically dominant groups. Id. These two segments of the black community each represent
roughly one-fourth of the total black population of 27.5 million. Id.
3. Christopher S. Wren, Namibia: Rebel Group Wins Vote, But It Falls Short of Full
Control, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1989, at Al.
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After the war, South Africa governed the territory under a League of
Nations mandate.4 When the United Nations was created after World
War II, South Africa, unlike other countries holding League mandates,
refused to accept United Nations jurisdiction over the territory.- Finally,
in 1966, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution termi-
nating the mandate, an action that the South African government failed
to recognize.6
The seminal event in Namibia's quest for independence was the
1978 adoption and subsequent implementation of United Nations Secur-
ity Council Resolution 435. U. N. Resolution 435 in essence mapped out
the termination of South Africa's governance over Namibia and
Namibia's much delayed movement toward independence.7 The stated
purpose of Resolution 435 was "to ensure the early independence of
Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the
United Nations."' Although all parties nominally accepted Resolution
435 in 1978, its implementation was delayed both by South African in-
transigence and by the presence of Cuban troops supporting the Angolan
government in its war against Joseph Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas.9
From this period through the eventual political settlement, the effec-
tive ruling elite in Namibia was the South African government. The
dominant, indeed the only, organized opposition movement was the
South-West African People's Movement (SWAPO), which began a two-
decade long guerilla war against South African rule over Namibia in
1966.1' The influence of SWAFO guerrillas in producing the eventual
transition to independence, however, proved to be negligible, as the
group was unable to effectively consolidate any internal opposition to
South African hegemony. 1 In fact, SWAPO did not participate in the
negotiations between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that resulted in
the eventual political settlement. 12 After a ten year interregnum,
Namibia's independence drive came to fruition as part of a regional peace
settlement linking South Africa's departure from Namibia to the with-




7. John A. Evenson, The Transition Timetable, AFR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 26-28.
8. Id at 28.
9. Id at 27.




Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
been embroiled in that country's civil war for nearly a decade. 13 In early
1989, United Nations peacekeeping forces were deployed in Namibia,
heralding the onset of a relatively peaceful and decidedly hurried transi-
tion to democratic self-rule.14
Elections were held in November of 1989 for seats in the seventy-
two member constituent assembly which had the nominal authority to
draft the constitution for an independent Namibia.15 SWAPO received
57.3 percent of the vote and forty-one of the seventy-two seats. 16 Despite
its success at the polls, however, SWAPO failed to garner the two-thirds
vote which, in effect, would have allowed it to unilaterally draft the nas-
cent constitution. 17 The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a multi-
racial grouping of twelve smaller parties, gained nearly 28.6 percent of
the vote and twenty-one seats. 8 In addition to the existence of a viable
domestic parliamentary opposition, SWAPO's political dominance was
further constrained by pervasive U.N. monitoring mechanisms and, most
significantly, by continued South African administration, supervision,
and final power of approval over the independence process.19
Given the aforementioned constraints on SWAPO's power and faced
by the need for compromise, the newly-elected constituent assembly for-
mulated a draft constitution based largely on a set of principles endorsed
by the United Nations Security Council in 1982.20 These principles in-
cluded the notion of a written constitution as the supreme law of the
land, an independent judiciary, elections by universal and equal suffrage,
and a declaration of fundamental rights consistent with the Universal
13. Evenson, supra note 7, at 28.
14. Id. at 26.




19. Namibia Reaches Agreement on a Western-Style Charter, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989,
at A8; Namibians Adopt New Constitution, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1990, at AS. Indeed, interna-
tional involvement clearly proved to be the most critical factor in producing the eventual set-
tlement in Namibia. Both the United Nations and South Africa were instrumental in
facilitating the adoption and enactment of Namibia's constitution. One of the central features
of this involvement was the activity of the United Nations transition assistance group (UN-
TAG), an 8,000-member contingent of administrators, electoral supervisors, and police
monitors responsible for the integrity of the electoral process and the subsequent transition to
independence. Namibian Elections Declared 'Free and Fair'; 97 Percent Turnout 'Impressive,
72 Seated in Constituent Assembly, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1990, at 41. As described in the text,
South Africa, in addition to its continued administrative control over Namibia during the
independence process, also maintained an effective power of final approval over the writing of
the final constitutional draft. Namibia Reaches Agreement on a Western-Style Charter, supra.
20. Namibian Elections Declared 'Free and Fair" supra note 19, at 41.
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Declaration of Human Rights. 1 In February 1990, the Namibian con-
stituent assembly ratified the new Western-style, liberal democratic con-
stitution and, one month later, officially declared Namibian
independence.'




The Namibian Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature,
similar in some respects to the United States Congress. The primary leg-
islative authority of the country is vested in the seventy-two member Na-
tional Assembly which has the power to pass laws with the assent of the
president,' 3 subject to the powers and functions of the National Council,
the upper legislative chamber. 4 In essence, the National Assembly en-
joys the full litany of legislative powers familiar to Western-style legisla-
tures, including making and repealing laws "for the peace, order and
good government, approving budgets, providing for revenue and taxa-
tion, and ratifying international agreements.'- 5
The primary institutional constraint on the legislature is the presi-
dential veto. This veto, however, is subject to an override by a two-
thirds majority of the National Assembly and a simple majority of the
National Council. 6 In addition, the National Assembly can be dissolved
by the president on the advice of the cabinet if the government is "unable
to govern effectively."'- 7 The constituent assembly, elected into office on
November 11, 1990, constituted the first National Assembly with mem-
bers' terms of office "deemed to have begun from the date of
independence."'- 8
2. National Council
As indicated, the Constitution also provides for a National Council,
21. Forging the World's Youngest Democracy; Namibia, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1990, at 41.
22. Namibians Adopt New Constitution, supra note 19, at A8.
23. NAMm. CONsT. art. 44, reprinted in Further Report of the Secretary-General Concern-
ing the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) Concerning the Question of
Namibia, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/20967/Add.2 (1990).
24. Id
25. Id art. 63.
26. Id art. 56.
27. Id art. 57.
28. -d art. 133.
19931
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an upper house consisting of two members elected from each of the re-
gional governmental units.29 In general, the powers of the National
Council are more restricted than those of the lower chamber since its
primary authority is the review of legislation.30 The essential aspects of
this power of review include the ability to propose amendments to bills
and a veto power over legislation by a two-thirds majority of the Na-
tional Council subject to a two-thirds majority override by the National
Assembly.31 Furthermore, the National Council has the power to over-
ride presidential vetoes of legislation in conjunction with the National
Assembly.32 As such, the principal function of the National Council is to
serve as a constraint on the powers of both the National Assembly and
the president.
B. Electoral System
The seventy-two members of the National Assembly are elected
from "party lists and in accordance with the principles of proportional
representation. ' 33 This procedure appears to coalesce with the 1982
United Nations principles, which advocate an electoral system that en-
sures "fair representation" to those political parties that manage to gain
substantial support in the election.34 Under this system, the electorate
casts ballots for the various political parties, as opposed to individual
candidates, and seats in the legislature are allocated to the respective par-
ties based on the proportion of votes received. 35 The parties then deter-
mine which members to nominate for seats in the legislature from
prescribed party lists. 36 The net result of this particular electoral system
is that parliamentarians do not represent specific electoral districts-as in
U.S. congressional elections-but instead have a nationwide mandate.
Members of the National Council are not popularly elected but are
chosen by the representatives of each of the several Regional Councils,
37
the principal governing bodies of the regional political units. This
method is identical to the original scheme by which senators were chosen
for the U.S. Senate prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amend-
29. Id. art. 69.
30. Id. art. 75.
31. Id.
32. d art. 56.
33. Id. art. 49.
34. Forging the World's Youngest Democracy; Namibia, supra note 21, at 44.
35. NAMIB. CONST. sched. 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 69.
[Vol. 16
The Namibian Constitutional Model
ment which provided for their popular election."' Significantly, the
Namibian Constitution requires that the regional boundaries be drawn
only along geographical lines, "without any references to the race, color,
or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of such areas.
' 39
The president is chosen by direct and universal suffrage in a nation-
wide general election.' Procedurally, the Constitution stipulates that
the president must receive a majority, as opposed to a mere plurality, of
the votes cast; supplemental ballots are utilized to achieve such a result.41
In addition, the Constitution provides that any registered political party
is entitled to field a candidate, and any individual supported by a certain
minimum number of registered voters is also entitled to be nominated as
a candidate.42
C. Other Provisions
One of the central features of the Namibian Constitution is a Bill of
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms which provides for the pro-
tection of, inter alia, life, liberty, human dignity, and property.43 In addi-
tion, the Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial and the right to
engage in political activity.' Also enshrined within the Constitution are
certain fundamental freedoms such as those of speech and expression,
assembly and association, thought, religion, and travel.45
Article 78 of the Constitution establishes an independent judiciary,
the centerpiece of which is the Supreme Court of Namibia with the
power of appellate review over those issues involving the interpretation,
implementation, and enforcement of the Constitution and the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms.' Decisions of the Supreme Court can be law-
fully overridden by acts of the legislature.4 7
The executive power of the country is vested in a directly elected
president limited to two five-year terms of office.4 8 The Constitution pro-
vides that for purposes of the first five-year term, the president will not be
popularly elected but will be chosen by a simple majority of constituent
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
39. NAMIB. CONST. art. 102.
40. Id art. 28.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id arts. 6, 7, 8, 16.
44. Id arts. 12, 17.
45. Id art. 21.
46. Id arts. 78, 79.
47. Id art. 81.
48. Id arts. 28, 29.
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assembly members.4 9 As expected, the constituent assembly dutifully
elected Sam Nujoma, the long-time leader of SWAPO, as the first presi-
dent of newly-independent Namibia."
The president has effective veto power over legislation, subject to
override by a vote of two-thirds of the National Assembly and a simple
majority of the National Council.51 Additional powers of the president
include the discretion to dissolve the National Assembly and to appoint
up to six non-voting members to that body.52 When the president does
dissolve the National Assembly, the Constitution provides that a new
presidential election shall be held within ninety days.5 3 Another check
on the power of the president is the legislature's prerogative to impeach
the president through a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of
both houses.54
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR A
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
The defining moment of the current political developments in South
Africa was President F.W. de Klerk's speech to Parliament on February
2, 1990, In that speech, the President set the government on a course of
reform and reconciliation with the country's black majority, in effect
shifting the emphasis from one of "confrontation and violence" to a "de-
bate and discussion of political and economic points of view as part of the
process of negotiation." 5 The ruling National Party also took several
concrete steps in pursuit of the "new and just constitutional dispensation
in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportu-
nity in every sphere of endeavor-constitutional, sociad and economic."
5 6
The steps included the legalization of banned opposition groups, includ-
ing the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party; the
freeing of political prisoners, including the leader of the ANC, Nelson
Mandela, after twenty-seven years of imprisonment; and the selective
downscaling of the nationwide State of Emergency.51
49. Id art. 134. As noted above, supra note 28, the constituent assembly became the first
National Assembly.
50. Namibians Adopt New Constitution, supra note 19, at A8.
51. NAMIB. CONST. art. 56.
52. Id art. 32.
53. Id art. 29.
54. Id
55. F.W. de Klerk, The Season of Violence Is Over, Address Before the Opening of Par-
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One year later, President de Klerk announced before Parliament an
additional series of measures repealing those laws long considered the
pillars of apartheid, thereby heralding, at least superficially, the demise of
apartheid as a legal system." These repealed laws included the Land
Acts of 1913 and 1936, which reserved most of the country's land for the
white minority; the Group Areas Act, which established the separate sta-
tus of the black townships; and the Population Registration Act, which
classified all South Africans, at birth, into four racial groups: blacks,
whites, Asians, and people of mixed race or colored. 9 In addition, the
government previously scrapped the Separate Amenities Act, which al-
lowed municipalities to reserve public services for whites.'
In South Africa, political, economic, and military power is en-
trenched in the hands of the white ruling class. The critical issue for
South Africa is whether this disparity in power is sufficient to allow the
National Party to impose a constitutional formula on the rest of society
by either ignoring the demands of the opposition movements or by
merely coopting certain segments of the black population. Presently, a
settlement solely on the government's terms appears unlikely. As ex-
pressed by Nelson Mandela, "[n]egotiations cannot take place... above
the heads or behind the backs of our people .... [Tihe future of our
country can only be determined by a body which is democratically
elected on a nonracial basis.
' '61
In contrast to the Namibian experience, it is extremely unlikely that
international pressure will play a role in the constitution-planning pro-
cess in South Africa beyond the already existing threat of economic,
political, and cultural sanctions. Instead, domestic groups, led by the
ANC, will continue to apply pressure and play a critical role in the devel-
opment of any constitutional settlement in South Africa. The final out-
come will result from a careful compromise between the ANC and the
ruling National Party, the two dominant parties on the South African
political scene.62 Nonetheless, because of the powerful bargaining posi-
58. Christopher S. Wren, South Africa Moves to Scrap Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1991, at Al.
59. Id
60. kd at A7.
61. Nelson Mandela, Address at Cape Town City Hall (Feb. 11, 1990), in N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1990, at AlO. The democratically elected body referred to by Nelson Mandela is a
constituent assembly, similar to Namibia's, which would have the authority to draft a new
constitution.
62. Significantly, however, conservative elements within the white population may also
play an increasingly critical role, if only as a source of political pressure on the current govern-
ment. The most recent manifestation of this political pressure was the decision of the National
Party to submit its reform program to the white voters in a referendum. This decion was
1993]
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tion of the white government and the need-whether real or perceived-
for constitutional protections for the white population, one would antici-
pate that the outcome will more than adequately address white concerns,
possibly even at the expense of commonly accepted democratic norms.
It is against this backdrop that the current constitutional debate un-
folds. The fundamental objective of the innumerable constitutional pro-
posals is to extend political power to the disenfranchised black majority.
The means by which political representation is to be determined and the
significance of that representation in the legislature is the primary em-
phasis of the following discussion. Several related areas of concern, such
as a Bill of Rights, the judiciary, and the structure of an executive cabi-
net, will also be considered.
A. Legislature
Both the ruling white-governed National Party and the opposition
ANC are in general agreement as to the overall structure of the federal
legislature. Both parties have proposed a bicameral parliament with a
lower chamber elected directly by the voters and an upper house organ-
ized along some form of regional lines.6 3 The crux of the debate focuses
on the powers that the upper chamber, or senate, would have and on the
territories or groups that would be represented in that chamber.
1. Lower House
The fundamental principle upon which all sides appear to agree is
that the lower chamber of parliament will be elected by one-person, one-
vote on a common voters' roll: in other words, universal and equal suf-
frage.64 This would concur with Nelson Mandela's commitment to the
Harare Declaration, which proclaims the need for "universal suffrage,
exercised through one person, one vote,' under a common voters' roll."'65
The consensus among most white South Africans and the majority of
made in direct response to the strong showing of the Conservative Party in recent by-elcctions
and the challenge that this presented to the National Party's public mandate for reform.
Christopher S. Wren, De Klerk's Risk is Whites' Ultimatum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1992, at
A3.
63. Kenneth B. Noble, South African President Outlines Plan for Universal Voting Righits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at Al.
64. South Africa; The Tryst at the Tuynhuis, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 50.
65. Id. The Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, promulgated by
the ANC in 1988, state that "[i]n the exercise of their sovereignty, the people shall have the
right to vote under a system of universal suffrage based on the principle of one person/one
vote." See Albie Sachs, Toward a Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa, 12 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 289, 322-24 (1989).
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outside observers is that seats in this lower house will be allocated on the
basis of proportional representation, thereby ensuring a significant degree
of minority-group representation. 6 The ANC, of course, as the preemi-
nent opposition movement, consistently favors an electoral formula that
would produce a system of majority rule.67
2. Upper House
Most commentators argue that the upper chamber of parliament
should be a federal body elected on separate, group-based electoral
rolls.6" The critical question, however, is whether the "groups" consti-
tuting the electoral bases for this upper house will be drawn along re-
gional-geographic lines (as in the United States Senate and the Namibian
National Council) or in terms of ethnic, cultural, or linguistic divisions.
In other words, the issue is whether the electoral districts which the leg-
islators represent will be defined territorially or by population groups.
a. Territorial Federalism
The least controversial proposal, and one that has been floated at
various times by both the National Party and the ANC, recommends an
upper chamber organized along the regional divisions of South African
society.69 The government's most recent plan calls for the creation of
nine new administrative regions, where the local governments would
elect or appoint representatives to a federal legislature.70 Composition of
the regions would presumably maximize minority-group representation
in the parliament.7 This could conceivably be achieved by drawing ter-
ritorial boundaries so as to isolate regions of white numerical preponder-
ance, thereby ensuring that at least some of the local governmental units
would be dominated by whites and/or their political allies. In addition,
ethnic/tribal cleavages within the black community could be preserved
and effectively exploited by having the various regions correspond to the
traditional ethnic "homelands" of the numerous indigenous African
groups.72 Under current National Party proposals, five of the ten ethnic
66. Mallaby, supra note 2, at 5.
67. Holman Jenkins, Jr., There's No Dearth of Ideas on Shape of Things to Come, IN-
siGHT, Dec. 4, 1989, at 30. Proposals relating to the electoral system are discussed more
extensively infra part rn-B.
68. See Noble, supra note 63, at Al.
69. Ia
70. Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations, CAPE TImEs (S. Ar.), reprinted in Focus ON
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homelands (KwaZulu, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, and Qwa
Qwa) are assigned to different administrative regions. 73 One point of ne-
gotiation-and possible contention-will be the status of the four nomi-
nally independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and
Ciskei (the TBVC states), which will most certainly require reincorpora-
tion into any new political scheme.74
b. Corporate/Non-Territorial Federalism
The most controversial proposal suggests creating administrative
"groups" based not on geography but on ethnic, cultural, or linguistic
affiliation. A residual category would be available for those individuals
who choose not to affiliate with any of the official background groups.75
These "groups" would, in effect, serve as corporate electoral districts,
each receiving equal representation in parliament.76 Yet another South
African proposal suggests a hybrid approach combining elements of ter-
ritorial and corporate federalism. According to this scenario, representa-
tives for the upper house would be drawn from newly-created geographic
regions as well as from groups voluntarily formed around common prin-
ciples such as language, culture, or religion.7 7 In contrast, Article 102 of
the Namibia Constitution rejects this system of corporate federalism by
expressly proscribing the delineation of regional boundaries along any-
thing but regional, or geographic, lines.78
The primary advantage of non-geographic districts is that they guar-
antee the representation of ethnic minorities in the legislative process-a
legitimate concern in the volatile milieu of ethnic pluralism that charac-
terizes South Africa. 79 Significant manifestations of this ethnic divisive-
73. Id.
74. Id. In the years since attaining ostensible sovereignty in the late 1970s and early
1980s as part of the National Party's policy of "separate development," only the South African
government has recognized the independence of these four homelands. In its most recent con-
stitutional proposals, the National Party neglected to incorporate the TBVC states into any of
the nine newly-proposed administrative regions. Id. This omission is significant since both
Transkei and Ciskei are the traditional homelands of the Xhosa tribe-the predominant ethnic
African group within the leadership ranks of the ANC. Jenkins, supra note 67, at 31.
75. Arend Lijphart, The Ethnic Factor and Democratic Constitution-Making in South Af-
rica, in SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: DoMESTIC CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 13, 16-20 (Edmond J. Keller & Louis A. Picard eds., 1989). One of the fundamen-
tal problems facing proponents of this theory of corporate federalism involves whether to ex-
plicitly identify the various segments of society that qualify for representation or to allow these
segments to identify themselves at the polls. Id.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Ralph Slovenko, The Destiny of South Africa, THE WORLD & 1, July 1991, at 77.
78. NAMIn. CONST. art. 102.
79. See, e.g., Mallaby, supra note 2, at 5.
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ness are apparent within both the white and black communities in South
Africa. In the white community, conservative elements, consisting
mostly of Afrikaans-speaking whites, are waging a political battle against
those groups, including the ruling National Party, which are more
predisposed to reforming the apartheid system. In the black community,
a violent conflict persists between the ANC (whose leadership as well as
rank and file is of predominantly Xhosa ethnic extraction) and Inkatha,
the Zulu cultural/political organization headed by Chief Mangosuthu
Gatsha Buthelezi. 0
Although the term district usually has a geographic meaning and the
prospect of organizing "electoral" districts according to prescribed eth-
nic divisions may seem alien, if not repugnant, to most observers, it is
important to remember that electoral units are not necessarily or exclu-
sively geographic."1 In the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, for example,
blacks and whites cast ballots in separate districts for predetermined
numbers of representatives, thereby giving the white population a mea-
sure of over-representation in the legislature.8" In previous elections in
New Zealand, minority ethnic Maoris had the option of registering as
electors on specified Maori electoral rolls, thereby ensuring Maori polit-
ical representation. 3 Similarly in Cyprus, prior to the 1963 civil war and
the resulting partition of the country, Greek and Turkish Cypriots voted
in separate ethnically-drawn electoral districts with representation in
proportion to each group's numerical strength.8
An alternative approach was presented by the Lebanese National
Pact, an informal political consensus between the divergent religious
groups which established a period of democratic stability in Lebanon
from 1943 until its disintegration in 1975."5 Under this system, voters
cast ballots for tickets or slates of candidates. In each constituency, the
candidate slates were nominated in such a way that each slate reflected
the religious/ethnic composition of that particular constituency.86 In
80. Christopher S. Wren, The Chief Steps Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 22. This conflict, which ostensibly began in the mid-1980s, has claimed more than
5,000 lives. Id,
81. Arend Lijphart, Proportionality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Representation in
Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany and Zimbabwe, in ELECTORAL
LAWS AND THEm POLirICAL CONSEQUENCES 113, 116 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart
eds., 1986).
82. Id. at 116-18.
83. Id
84. Id at 117.
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other words, candidates were placed on each slate in predetermined sec-
tarian ratios, resulting in a legislature with prescribed representation in
proportion to the country's ethnic make-up.
Even in the United States, the decennial apportionment battles have
tended to expose a similar concern for representative equality of minority
groups. Electoral discrimination in the form of voting strength dilution,
particularly in the South, resulted in a rash of lawsuits since the enact-
ment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 7 The apparent objective of these
suits was to force states to draw district lines in such a way that minority
groups were assured of electoral majorities in certain electoral districts, a
practice one scholar has termed "benevolent gerrymandering."8 8 Justice
White, writing for the majority in United Jewish Organizations of Wil-
liamsburgh v. Carey, emphasized that an intentional reduction of white
voting would be constitutionally permissible and, furthermore, that it
would also be permissible for a state, "employing sound districting prin-
ciples such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to pre-
vent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts
that will afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups
who are sufficiently numerous.... ""
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Burger characterized the legisla-
ture's attempt at drawing district lines so as to increase the electoral
strength of certain minorities as a "strict quota approach."9 The Chief
Justice added that racial gerrymandering "will not promote the goal of a
racially neutral legislature" but instead "puts the imprimatur of the State
on the concept that race is a proper consideration in the electoral
process." 91
87. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The Voting Rights Act of 1965
"prohibits a State or political subdivision subject to ... the Act from implementing a legisla-
tive reapportionment unless it has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for
the District of Columbia, or a ruling from the Attorney General of the United States, that the
reapportionment 'does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color . . . .'" United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 147 (quoting § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c). The Act was "designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimina-
tion in voting. .. ." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
88. David Wells, Against Affirmative Gerrymanderin& in REPRitSENTATION AND REDIS-
TRICTImG IssuEs 77, 85 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982). Of course, one could also phrase
it in terms of preventing the states from nullifying electoral majorities by drawing district lines
in such a way that minority voting strength is diluted.
89. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 167-68 (emphasis
added).
90. Id. at 182 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 186.
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3. Legislative Powers
The debate over the composition of the upper house, particularly the
controversial issue of guaranteed representation of minority groups,
would, of course, be meaningless if that body's legislative powers were
considerably subordinate to the popularly elected lower house. With re-
spect to the more powerful lower house of parliament, the National Party
has recommended that general legislation be passed by simple majority
assent.92 However, issues "entrenched in the constitution" would be sub-
ject to a "weighted majority"-presumably a two-thirds majority re-
quirement.93 Another proposal entitles all parties of a specified
minimum size to a cabinet position, thereby ensuring a form of executive
power-sharing on a basis nearly proportional to electoral support.9
As discussed above, it is likely that an upper legislative chamber will
effectively over-represent certain minority groups in a fashion similar to
that of the United States Senate, where, in keeping with James Madison's
admonition that a republican government "ought to be founded on a
mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation,1
95
states of unequal population size do in fact enjoy equal representation
and voting strength. The critical distinction from South Africa's propo-
sal is that U.S. Senate districts are defined exclusively in geographic
terms, not on the basis of ethnic, cultural, or linguistic affiliation.
Like the U.S. Senate, proposals for South Africa's upper house gen-
erally call for a strong veto right over legislation proposed by the more
powerful lower house.96 In addition to a system of checks and balances
between the two legislative bodies, constitutional negotiators must define
the scope of the minority veto powers within each chamber.97 In either
case, presumably, this veto power would be limited to the degree neces-
sary to allow for the normal functioning of government. It would be
administratively impractical and, in the long run, counter-productive to
empower all minority parties with a dictatorial veto right over the full
range of legislation. Events in Cyprus present an instructive example of
92. Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations; supra note 70, at 1.
93. Id.
94. Slovenko, supra note 77, at 77.
95. THE FEDERALiST No. 62 (James Madison).
96. Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations, supra note 70, at 1.
97. A recent manifestation of this issue is the dispute that arose between government and
ANC negotiators concerning minority veto power over ratification of a new constitution. The
ANC proposed that the eventual legislature should approve the new constitution by a 66.7%
majority while the government suggested 75%. Discussions soon broke down between the
parties over this seemingly innocuous 8.5% differential. Creating a New South Africa, SUN.
TimEs (S. Afr.), reprinted in Focus ON SouTH AFRIcA, June 1992, at 3.
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the potentially harmful effects of a minority veto. There, it was a reac-
tionary overuse of an absolute veto right by the Turkish minority that




Historically, elections for the white parliament were held in accord-
ance with the principles of Westminster-style majoritarianism, a mecha-
nism which allowed the ruling National Party to fully consolidate its grip
on power over the past decades.99 Not surprisingly, it is now the same
National Party which advocates the scrapping of majority rule in favor of
proportional representation."00 It is now primarily the ANC which sup-
ports an electoral system that tends to facilitate majority rule that, in one
activist's words, "can provide the central government with sufficient
power to redistribute wealth and reorganize a very corrupt society."'' 1
The primary characteristic of majoritarianism is the single-member
electoral district where the candidate receiving a majority of the votes,
or, in some cases, merely a plurality, wins the seat in. parliament. 102 One
significant consequence of a majoritarian electoral system is its tendency
to overrepresent the largest political groupings in society at the near
complete expense of smaller parties, especially minority groups.103 The
commonly cited political advantage offered by this formula is that it pro-
vides for strong and stable one-party government by allowing the most
popular political party to achieve a majority in the legislature.104 This is
essentially the same system with which Americans are familiar and is
also the system of choice in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. 105
One significant example of the arguably deleterious effects of this
"winner-take-all" system is provided by the results of the 1983 British
98. LuPHART, supra note 85, at 158-61.
99. Jenkins, supra note 67, at 30.
100. South Africa; The Tryst at the Tuynhuis, supra note 64, at 50.
101. Jenkins, supra note 67, at 30.
102. VERNON BOGDANOR, WHAT IS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATON? 14-29 (Martin
Robertson ed., 1984).
103. Id. at 15.
104. Peter J. Taylor, The Case for Proportional Tenure: A Defense of the British Electoral
System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 54 (1984).
105. DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 42-44
(1967).
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parliamentary elections.Y°6 In 1983 the Conservative Party, by far the
single most popular party in Britain at the time, received 42.4% of the
popular vote nationwide. 10 7 This degree of electoral support, however,
translated into 61% of the parliamentary seatsWB1 Labour garnered
27.6% of the votes and 32% of the seats."° The capriciousness of the
system is dramatized, however, by the results of the third major party in
Britain, the Liberal/SDP Alliance. The Alliance received 25.4% of the
nationwide vote yet won only an absurdly small 3.5% of the legislative
seats." 0
While disproportionate electoral results in the name of pragmatic
one-party stability may often prove more acceptable in politically and
ethnically homogeneous countries, it is unlikely that similar results
would sit well with smaller political parties in a society such as South
Africa where the stakes are so much higher and the need for consensus
and coalition-building are so much more compelling. South Africa is far
from an ethnically homogeneous community.' In fact, it may even be
ill-advised to interpret the basic problem solely in terms of a dichoto-
mous black-white conflict." 2 As observed, the black and white commu-
nities are each deeply divided, to the point where there "is no doubt that
an exclusively black South Africa would be an ethnically plural society
on a par with most of the black states in Africa."113 Although these
ethnic cleavages are, for the most part, "currently muted by feelings of
black solidarity in opposition to white rule, they are bound to reassert
themselves in a situation of universal suffrage and free electoral competi-
tion.""' 4 Majoritarianism, then, would be "inappropriate and... dan-
gerous" even for South Africa's black citizens, as it would undoubtedly
prompt the latent tensions and hostilities typical of plural societies to
assert themselves among the black ethnic groups.' 15
2. Proportional Representation
As mentioned above, proposals for a parliament elected by propor-
tional representation have emanated primarily from the white govern-
106. BOGDANOR, supra note 102, at 3-13.
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ment and its supporters-as well as, it should be noted, from the
majority of scholarly observers. In fact, if one excludes those countries
with a decidedly British influence, the vast majority of the world's de-
mocracies utilize some variation of proportional representation. In the
words of one commentator, "majoritarianism is clearly not the prevalent
norm among the world's democracies . . . . [A]mong the twenty-one
countries that have enjoyed continuous democratic rule since the end of
the Second World War, about two-thirds use [proportional representa-
tion] and only four use the British plurality system." 116 Countries which
utilize some variation of proportional representation include Denmark,
Italy, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Austria, Belgium, and
Finland.'
17
Although fair and effective representation for all citizens is often
viewed as an electoral goal even in the politically homogeneous United
States-in the context of district apportionment' "--the need for repre-
sentative equality is especially critical in those countries with stark eth-
nic, religious, or linguistic divisions. The essence of proportional
representation is that, as the name suggests, parliamentary seats are allo-
cated to political parties on a basis proportional to the number of votes
cast in their favor.1 9 As in elections for the Namibian National Assem-
bly, the typical procedure under a proportional representation system is
for the elector to vote, not for individual candidates, but for the political
party of his or her choice. The party is then allocated legislative seats
according to the proportion of votes received and will nominate candi-
dates for these seats from an established party list.'"0
In contrast to majoritarian systems which tend to result in the "for-
mation and maintenance of two-party systems and discriminate against
minority parties whose support is not concentrated territorially," propor-
tional representation rewards all parties on a basis proportionate to their
electoral support.12 1 As such, proportional representation is evenhanded
in its effect on ethnic and non-ethnic groups and does not favor any par-
ticular majority or minority, thereby enabling smaller parties to flourish
as they could not under a majoritarian system. 2 2
Another advantage of proportional representation is that it sorts out
116. Lijphart, supra note 75, at 21.
117. RAE, supra note 105, at 42-44.
118. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
119. RAE, supra note 105, at 33-35.
120. ENID LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE: A STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
92-107 (1974).
121. BOGDANOR, supra note 102, at 19.
122. Lijphart, supra note 75, at 21.
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ethnic and other divisions in society without the need for rigid predeter-
mination of "groups." Under this system voters themselves decide which
political groupings they will affiliate with through their choice at the bal-
lot box. Political parties do, after all, tend to be voluntary associations
which can define themselves in whatever terms seem appropriate,
whether cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or racial." As a result, the sticky
problems of having the Constitution both define the various "groups" in
South Africa and, more troubling, determine which of these deserve par-
liamentary representation, are obviated. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, proportional representation may be the only electoral system
favoring minority groups that the ANC and other black groups would
accept, at least for elections to the lower house of parliament.' 24
C. Other Provisions
One solid point of agreement among the various factions in South
Africa is the need for a bill of rights.1 25 Clearly, a South African bill of
rights will need to extend at least as far as the Namibian version. How-
ever, in addition to the protection of those human or individual rights
shared by all South Africans, there is little doubt that there will be guar-
antees of a more parochial nature. Preeminent among these would be,
for instance, the protection of the Afrikaners' right to speak their own
language and practice their own religion and, presumably, conduct
schooling in Afrikaans.1 26 In addition, there is little doubt that white
South Africans will vigorously endorse strong assurances for the protec-
tion of property rights, even to the extent of writing such guarantees into
the bill of rights. 27 Some have suggested that the National Party may
seek to enshrine independence for the central bank or even ask for fiscal
promises that would bind the first popularly elected government to limits
on, for example, the size of the budget or government borrowing. 28
Given the desire for a bill of rights, it could also be generally stipu-
lated that a certain feature of any constitution will be an independent
judiciary with the authority to guard the integrity of the constitution and
the freedoms enshrined therein. In addition, judicial review will be nec-
essary in settling the disputes that will most assuredly arise between fed-
eral and regional governmental units out of the proposed devolution of
123. Id at 20.
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the central government's political power.129 Historically, the judiciary in
South Africa was relatively independent from government control.t3° It
cannot be denied, however, that despite its independence, the judiciary
has shown a strong commitment to the legislative policy and ideology of
the ruling elite over the past few decades.
131
One area where there will likely be significant differences of opinion
between the various parties will be the extent of power retained by the
executive office. Given the demographic realities of South Africa, the
white minority will undoubtedly seek an executive president with little
more than ceremonial powers. On the other hand, black South Africans
aligned with the ANC typically propose a strong executive with sufficient
powers to effectuate the political, economic, and social changes they per-
ceive as necessary.
132
Naturally, the independent, popularly-elected president could be
discarded entirely if the executive powers were instead vested in a parlia-
mentary-style prime minister whose authority stemmed from support in
the legislature.133 In line with this approach are the National Party's
most recent proposals which call for an executive in the form of a collec-
tive body, to be known as the Presidency.134 It is evident that the "presi-
dency" envisaged in the National Party proposals is in fact a prime
minister, albeit in collective form, with its members drawn from the
ranks of parliament. As proposed by the National Party, this body
would consist of leaders of the three largest parties in the lower parlia-
mentary house. 135 In the event that these three would not represent the
majority of voters in the legislature, the Presidency would be supple-
mented by as many additional leaders as required to represent a major-
ity. 136 The chairmanship of this committee would rotate among the
members, and decisions would be made by consensus. 137 One example of
129. Id.
130. Slovenko, supra note 77, at 71.
131. HERIBERT ADAM & KOGILA MOODLEY, SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT APARTHEID;
DISMANTLING RACIAL DOMINATION 231 (1986).
132. Jenkins, supra note 67, at 30.
133. In most parliamentary systems, the executive power is vested in an individual drawn
from the ranks of the majority party in the legislature and known, in common parlance, as the
prime minister-the head of government. The head of state is usually a ceremonial position
under the traditional parliamentary system and can take the form of a popularly-elccted presi.
dent, as in Germany, or of the royal crown, as with the Queen of England. Under the Ameri-
can system, executive power is lodged in a powerful, popularly-elected president who is both
head of government and head of state.
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a viable executive power-sharing body is the Swiss federal executive,
which attempts representation of that country's political, linguistic, reli-
gious, and cantonal divisions.13
Another constitutional mechanism designed to safeguard minority
rights is the offering of cabinet positions on the basis of "group" affilia-
tion, with, for example, one representative from each group serving on a
multiparty cabinet.13 9 Proposals set forth by the South African govern-
ment's constitutional think tanks generally envision a cabinet with mem-
bers elected or appointed from each of the major political parties, thereby
ensuring minority participation in the major decision-making areas of
government."4 It is less likely that cabinet positions will be apportioned
explicitly on the basis of ethnicity or race, although such an institutional
arrangement would not be unprecedented. One of the most promising
models of prescribed ethnic balancing is the Belgian Constitution which
stipulates that the cabinet be composed of equal numbers of Flemish and
French-speakers.
141
V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAMIBIAN MODEL AND
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS
A. Codification of Ethnic/Racial Divisions
Dispute among the constitutional negotiators in South Africa will
likely continue over the legislative structure and, more specifically, the
exact composition of the two chambers of parliament. South Africa's
lower house will presumably be elected on the same principles embodied
in the electoral scheme for Namibia's National Assembly, a one-person,
one-vote system of proportional representation. 142 The Namibian upper
house, the National Council, is elected on purely geographic-regional
lines.' 43 South African proposals, however, suggest an upper house or-
ganized along predetermined ethnic or cultural classifications. 1" Even if
the district lines for this South African legislative chamber were drawn
by geographic region, it is plausible to assume that the constitutionally
mandated regions would correspond with and make evident the ethnic
divisions in society. The obvious result of the current South African pro-
138. Arend Lijphart & Diane R. Stanton, A Democratic Blueprint for South Africa, Bus. &
Soc'Y Rav., Spring 1986, at 30.
139. Slovenko, supra note 77, at 77; Noble, supra note 63, at Al.
140. See SIovenko, supra note 77, at 77.
141. Lijphart & Stanton, supra note 138, at 30.
142. See id at 28.
143. See supra text accompanying note 29.
144. See Slovenko, supra note 77, at 77.
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posals would be to guarantee some measure of overrepresentation of mi-
nority groups in the legislature.
Electoral results disproportionately favoring the majority group, as
are commonly attained in countries employing majoritarian electoral sys-
tems, are anathema to ethnically divided societies like South Africa. As
one commentator put it, where the political culture tends to be "homoge-
neous and pragmatic," as in the Anglo-American democracies, the polit-
ical process "takes on some of the atmosphere of a game."'145 Where the
stakes are particularly high, however, the game environment is not advis-
able. 46 Accordingly, "in a political system with clearly separate and po-
tentially hostile population segments, virtually all decisions are perceived
as entailing high stakes, and strict majority rule places a strain on the
unity and peace of the system."147 Opting for an electoral system of pro-
portional representation, however, may not be sufficient to safeguard the
interests of minority groups in South Africa. Although some may wince
at the prospect of predetermined ethnic representation, such a mecha-
nism may well provide a necessary check on the potentially abusive am-
bitions of majority groups. The key to this exercise in constitutional
engineering will be to ensure a measure of power-sharing among the di-
vergent groups while at the same time retaining an aura of legitimacy
over the system.
Another mechanism by which to ensure legislative participation by
minority groups, thereby checking the power of the majority, is the mi-
nority veto. In Namibia, the upper house does not have an absolute veto
power over the lower house's law-making prerogatives. Instead, the Na-
tional Council's power of review over legislation is subject to a two-thirds
majority override by the National Assembly.148 In South Africa, numer-
ous proposals suggest an absolute veto in the hands of the upper parlia-
mentary chamber over all or certain types of legislation.1 49 Assuming
that the upper house would guarantee representation of ethnic minority
groups in the parliamentary process, these groups then would be granted
a powerful and potentially divisive veto power over legislation. Although
the minority veto, in some form, is an essential restraint on majority tyr-
145. LuPHART, supra note 85, at 27 (emphasis added) (quoting Gabriel A. Almond, Com-
parative Political Systems, J. POL. 398-99 (1956)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 28.
148. See supra text accompanying note 31.
149. See, eg., Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations, supra note 70, at 1; Slovenko, supra note
77, at 77.
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anny, care must be had not to transform the veto into a weapon of abuse
and deadlock.
B. Role of Executive
It is impossible to analyze the legislative structure without simulta-
neously addressing the role of the executive office in the overall constitu-
tional scheme. Indeed, this is an area of profound difference between the
Namibian scheme and that contemplated in South Africa. The
Namibian Constitution provides for a popularly elected executive presi-
dent with significant powers over the legislature, judiciary, and the exec-
utive cabinet. 150 South African constitutional proposals generally
envisage either a president whose authority would be closely circum-
scribed by the two chambers of parliament or a prime minister elected
from the ranks of the legislature.15 1 More radical plans call for an execu-
tive council-a collective presidency--drawn from the legislature's main
political groupings instead of an individual, popularly elected
president. 152
Regardless of whether there is a popularly elected president or a
prime minister drawn from the parliament, the composition of the execu-
tive cabinet office will be a critical determinant of the degree to which the
various parties accept the notion of political power-sharing. In Namibia,
the executive cabinet consists of the popularly elected "President, the
Prime Minister, and other such Ministers as the President may appoint
from the members of the National Assembly." 15 3 Membership is not
prescribed on the basis of ethnicity or regionalism, and any attempts at
coalition-building are left to the discretion of the president, who may
extend cabinet membership to leaders of various political parties for the
sake of comity. This is precisely the approach adopted by Sam Nujoma,
the current President of Namibia. White Namibians have served in the
cabinet as Ministers of Finance and Agriculture and as Attorney
General. 15
Unlike Namibia, however, it is likely that a South African constitu-
tion will officially prescribe cabinet representation for all major parties in
the legislature, thereby ensuring a system of executive power-sharing.
Such an arrangement could potentially mitigate the impact of a powerful,
150. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also NAMIB. CONST. art. 32.
151. See Slovenko, supra note 77, at 77.
152. Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations, supra note 70, at 1.
153. NAMm. CONST. art. 35, cl. 1.
154. Christopher S. Wren, Independent a Year, Namibia Is Pragmatic at Home and Ideo-
logicalAbroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at A3.
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popularly elected president. As discussed above, representation in the
cabinet will probably be apportioned on the basis of political strength in
the legislature rather than on the basis of race or ethnicity. 5 Neverthe-
less, given the political stakes in South Africa and the urgent need to
avert the politics of exclusion, it is precisely such provisions for power-
sharing enshrined in the constitution that will be essential for the contin-
ued success of any political consensus in South Africa.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Africa and Namibia share certain important features. Princi-
pally, both are ethnically plural societies with deep cleavages dividing the
different segments of their respective populations. As such, one would
expect that both countries could accommodate essentially similar consti-
tutional systems. Indeed, as discussed above, the newly-enacted
Namibian constitutional formula does in many ways parallel the propos-
als put forth for a South African constitution.
The principles enshrined in both the Namibian Constitution and
South African blueprints include a divided central government with ex-
tensive checks and balances, a government accountable to its electorate,
constitutional protection of certain enumerated rights, and at least some
degree of federalism. At this stage in Namibia's political development,
these principles have yet to be compromised. More importantly, there
are few signs indicating that Namibian democracy and constitutionalism
will unravel in the near future.
However, these shared principles and the apparent success of
Namibia's constitutional enterprise will not deter South Africa from for-
mulating significant variations from Namibia's constitutional theme. In-
deed, this Note suggests that the Namibian Constitution will have only
limited utility as a model for South Africa. Instead, the most important
effect of the Namibian experience may be its symbolic impact as an ex-
ample of a successful transition to democracy in a demographic setting
that, at least superficially, resembles South Africa.
The likelihood that South Africa will pursue a constitutional settle-
ment that differs markedly from the Namibian Constitution is the result
of two overarching realities of the current South African milieu. One is
the inherent power-political, economic, and military-of the white mi-
nority. This position of strength will almost certainly allow the current
government to demand specific constitutional safeguards that are un-
available to whites under the Namibian Constitution. Unlike their South
155. Nats' Guidelines for Negotiations, supra note 70, at 1.
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African counterparts, the ruling white elite in Namibia did not bargain
from a position of strength during that country's transition to democ-
racy. Prior to independence, Namibia's white population was effectively
supported by the South African military and political presence. Once
South Africa extricated itself from the Namibian scene, however, white
Namibians had little option but to accede to the demands of the interna-
tional community and the aspirations of the black majority.
The second factor is the limited role that the international commu-
nity, especially the United Nations, will probably play in the process of
formulating a new constitutional structure in South Africa. As described
earlier, international involvement in Namibia was extensive. Not only
was the Constitution based on a series of democratic principles promul-
gated by the United Nations, but the United Nations itself was actively
involved in the logistics of the transition process. International involve-
ment in South Africa, on the other hand, will likely be limited to the
threat of sanctions and boycotts and to minor facilitative roles such as
monitoring elections.
The most striking difference between the two systems will likely be
the codification of "group" rights in South Africa's legislature and cabi-
net offices, replete with overrepresentation in parliament and dispropor-
tionate veto power over the legislative will of the majority. Purists of
democratic theory will undoubtedly criticize any formula that enshrines
"group" rights in the constitution, their concern being that "group"
rights amount to nothing more than the preservation of white privilege in
South African society. However, in the words of one commentator, in
forging a democratic constitution for South Africa, the most important
question concerns "what is acceptable rather than what is optimal."
156
Because of the power that the white government continues to yield, ex-
plicit protection of "group" rights and proportional representation-if
not overrepresentation-in the legislature may be the only "acceptable"
solution.
156. Lijphart, supra note 75, at 20.
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